Introduction
The management of babies with serious incurable medical conditions has been called "our most difficult area of paediatric practice".' Matters of law, ethics and conscience create dilemmas to which there are no easy answers. But professional responsibility forces clinicians to face these troubling questions and to try to deal with the reality of decision making in ways which combine compassion with legal and medical integrity.
That the issues are still current is demonstrated by two recent documents from the Netherlands2 and the UK.' The Dutch document arose from the deliberations of a discussion group set up in 1996 by the ministers of health and justice, "to make proposals regarding a notification and assessment procedure for cases in which the life of a newborn baby with a serious medical condition is deliberately ended". The British documentinstigated by a professional body, The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health in response to a House of Lords report3 -was produced following two years of widespread consultation. These documents address similar problems but, as will be shown later, respond differently.
It is known that responses to bioethical questions vary between European countries. [4] [5] [6] Clearly, too, a number of factors influence the management of these tragic cases, for example, the legal context, prohibitions and restrictions, professional codes and guidelines.
Although an enormous literature exists on the general subject of the limitation of treatment, no publications specifically address the context for decision making on behalf of neonates across Europe. Given that every country faces the problem, it seemed important to compare existing legislation and recommendations to identify differences as well as similarities.
Our study
To this end a European biomedical research project, EURONIC, was designed to study the relevant issues within France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The latest Italian Code of Professional Medical Ethics cautions against therapeutic aggressiveness, defined as "persisting with a treatment for which one cannot, with good reason, expect a benefit for the patient or any improvement in his/ her quality of life" (Codice di Deontologia Medica 1998 art 14). This document, however, has no legal status and the law neither makes mention of this issue nor does it differentiate between ordinary and extraordinary treatment. The clinical position is uncertain.
When it comes to newborns, Italian law is strongly protective. Non-treatment for such conditions as severe malformation or poor neurological prognosis, is considered a form of discrimination which violates article 3 of the Constitution, relating to the equality of all human beings. One court case in particular has served to clarify the Italian position."
A child in the course of an appendicectomy, suffered a cardiac arrest. One of the surgeons massaged his heart for about ten minutes to no effect. The team were subsequently sued for manslaughter. The defence offered was that more prolonged resuscitation might have saved his life but would have left him with irreversible brain damage. The judge would not accept the legal foundation for this claim and ruled that the principle of the inalienability of human life has to be respected.
GERMANY
German doctors have until very recently been obliged to do everything medically possible to preserve life. Within the last decade however, limitation of treatment has become accepted as an integral part of medical care for neonates when treatment is simply delaying an inevitable death.'2 Neither in jurisprudence nor in the literature have the limits of a doctor's obligation to treat a damaged neonate been specifically addressed. However, the German Medical Association Guidelines on Euthanasia relating to the support of dying patients are applicable inasmuch as they emphasise the need for dignity and good palliative care. ' In 1981 in Re B, the Court of Appeal authorised surgery to correct intestinal obstruction in an infant with Down's syndrome -treatment which the parents had refused. '6 In 1989 in Re C, both a High Court judge and the Lords of Appeal agreed that a very seriously damaged four-month-old child should be permitted to die. '7 In 1990 the case of Babyj_ concerned a child born at 27 weeks gestation who after weeks of intensive care was now severely brain damaged.'8 Medical opinion was that he might live into his teens; his quality of life was very poor but he was capable of feeling pain. The courts ruled that doctors should not be required to resuscitate him when he collapsed, if they judged such management was not in his best interests.
In 1992, in a case also referred to as Baby 7, the Court of Appeal upheld a decision not to order doctors to treat a patient who was 17 months old with severe problems.'9 20 In spite of parental and health authority opposition, the Court of Appeal ruled that the doctors should be free to exercise their clinical judgment at the time.
Although these cases have clarified the acceptability of limiting treatment where the quality of life is "demonstrably awful", "9 Parents of a child with Down's syndrome, and the Child Welfare Council, decided against an operation for a life-threatening intestinal obstruction. The paediatric surgeon, after consulting the hospital medical ethics committee, complied with their wishes but was subsequently prosecuted for failing to provide life-saving treatment. The Supreme Court ruled that even if an operation had been performed, both the child and the parents ran the considerable risk of a life of severe suffering, and criminal proceedings were not instituted.25
The parents of a one-year-old child with severe brain damage appealed a decision made by the paediatrician not to resuscitate if complications should occur. The Court of Utrecht held that doctors are not obliged to give medically futile treatment and that any decision as to futility should be based on clinical judgment.26
Ultimate responsibility for deciding the best course of action lies with the medical team caring for the child in both the Netherlands and the UK, but expert consultation is widely practised. In the Netherlands a medical ethics committee may also be consulted for advice, whereas in the UK there are few established clinical, as opposed to research, ethics committees. It is a requirement that Dutch clinicians consult colleagues when actively terminating a life. 27 In all countries which allow non-treatment decisions to be taken, great emphasis is placed on the need to give good quality care to the baby for whom aggressive management is not the best option. Indeed in the Netherlands it is a criminal offence not to provide ordinary compassionate care in such a case (Criminal Code sect 255).
Active intervention to end life
Though limitation of treatment may be acceptable, the intentional ending of a life by active means is a different matter. This issue is fraught with semantic, legal and ethical problems.
For the purposes of this paper we take active intervention to mean the considered intentional termination of life (for example, giving a patient a lethal injection designed to kill). Less clear cut are other practices which may be intended to relieve symptoms but have the effect of shortening life (for example, the administration of pain-relieving drugs in high doses; or paralytic agents before withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment), or which are a response to the child's medically futile condition (for example, failure to adjust ventilator settings or respond to worsening body chemistry; withholding of feeding). Persuasive arguments find no moral or legal distinction between acts of commission or of omission at the end of life,28 29 but clinicians recognise a powerful psychological distinction.30 31 Brief reference to the position in relation to consenting adults is relevant at this point. In no European country is euthanasia legal. In the Netherlands however, this prohibition is seen as inconsistent with the patient's right to selfdetermination. Both euthanasia and assisted suicide are criminal offences, but the acts will be "legally pardoned" 32 provided that certain specific criteria are met. A physician can claim force majeure where there is a conflict of duties between preserving life and relieving suffering. But recent Dutch recommendations2 specifically state that "a decision deliberately to end a patient's life cannot be regarded as a normal part of medical practice", and "should accordingly be carefully regulated and, most importantly, be subject to special scrutiny"
In the UK, France, and Italy the intentional termination of life, whether or not requested by the patient, is regarded as homicide and therefore illegal. There are no exceptions. Indeed recent official publications in the UK have reinforced that country's stated opposition to euthanasia. 3 In 1992 the Dutch Paediatric Association published a report of their detailed deliberations on this subject.39 As well as recognising the concept of an intolerable life they tried to define it using parameters such as life expectancy, extent of suffering, the capacity to communicate, and degree of independence.39"41 Parental consent is an essential prerequisite for the active termination of an infant's life.
The discussion group mentioned earlier2 discussed the issues further and suggested ways in which practice might be scrutinised. The best safeguard, they felt, would be retrospective assessment of each case by a multidisciplinary committee. They drew up an extremely detailed list of essential requirements, which includes: intolerable suffering; no viable alternatives; parental agreement; team discussion; independent consultation, and responsible practice. They concluded that the existing framework of criminal law should largely remain unchanged but recommended an examination of the framework towards reformulation of the legal definition of criminal action in this area.
The Netherlands is the only country which has openly tested the courts on the subject of doctors actively terminating the life of a child. Two recent cases drew attention to the competing duties of doctors to preserve life and to limit suffering and distress.
The first involved a gynaecologist, Dr Prins, who gave a lethal injection to a three-day-old baby girl born in 1993 with hydrocephaly, spina bifida and brain damage.42 A district court initially found him guilty of murder but he escaped punishment because of his careful treatment of his patient. In 1995, the Amsterdam Appeal Court dismissed the charges on the grounds that he had made a "justified choice" between his two conflicting duties.
One week later a district court in Groningen ruled that the action of Dr Kadijk, who ended the life of a baby with Trisomy 13, was justifiable in law. Even though the charge of murder had been legally proven, the court found that he had acted responsibly and in accordance with accepted medical ethics. Conclusion "There is no doubt that bioethics constitutes a response to the high level of concern about the tremendous challenges posed by science and lays bare our societies' uncomfortable attitude to developments which they fear may run out of control, developments which, while admittedly deemed marvellous by some, are seen as too rapid or threatening by others."4 Neonatal care is one such development and the wisdom of currently accepted medical practice must be questioned.
Clarification of the legal position is a slow process. But one thing has been repeatedly reinforced by legislation, through court cases and in professional guidelines: the lack of a legal or medical imperative to treat does not mean a cessation of care. The need to provide comfort and good nursing care, even where aggressive intensive therapy is contraindicated, is a paramount consideration in all cases.
Whatever the legal prohibitions or official boundaries, decisions are required about what constitutes overly aggressive treatment in a given case. In those countries such as the UK and the Netherlands, where clinical judgments about the child's best interests are permissible, doctors must use their intuition to determine what is best for this child and this family and what is and is not an intolerable burden. It is impossible to construct a frame of reference to fit all cases, even for a given country. And across Europe rules and practices vary so widely that it is difficult for groups to compose any universally acceptable guidelines.
It is clear from our investigation that different cultures, religious contexts and historical antecedents influence practice within Europe. Attempts have been made to try to harmonise practice4 54 but as international links grow, it is important to understand our diversity as well as our similarities. There is no country so advanced in its thinking that it cannot learn from its neighbours. 
